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IN THE SUPRE~!E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOANN E. BOOTH, aka JOANN 
E. CROt1PTON, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT CROMPTON, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
BRIEF OF hPPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15,276 
This is an action on a foreign divorce decree to en-
force payment of arrearages in support obligations. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found th~ plaintiff-respondent entitled 
to judgment against the defendant-appellant in the amount of 
$11,220.65. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant claims that the decision of the 
trial court was erroneous in that the plaintiff-respondent 
had assigned her rights to the cause of action, and was not 
entitled to bring it or to have judgment thereon. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Mrs. Crompton1 and defendant-
appellant Robert Crompton were divorced by a decree of the 
1
cirs. Cr:ompton has remarried and is known as t1rs. Booth, but 
for cl~r:ity will be referred to as Mrs. Crompton. 
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Clackamas County, Oregon, Court, filed July 9, 1969. (R. 
46). The decree provided for payment by Robert Ceompton of 
$150.00 pee month child support. ( R, 4 7). 
This amount was reduced to $100.00 pee month on Feb-
ruary 1, 1974. (Exhibit 1). Though Me. Crompton was 
irregular in making payments, he paid a substantial amount, 
exhibited by his receipts and by a copy of a payment eecod 
kept by the Oregon Court. (Exhibits 4 und 1). Mrs. Ceomptor 
sought judicial enforcement of present support payments 
several times, but never sought payment of delinquencies. 
(T. 5:30-6:7). 
During this period of time, Mes. Ceompton received 
welfare payments for support from the State of Oregon. (R. 
7:22-26). This was apparently done under the Oregon URE~ 
program (Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, O.R.S. Chaptee 1101 
since Mr. Crompton was then required to make his suppoet 
payments to the clerk of the county court. (See Exhibit 1). 
Mrs. Crompton testified that she assigned all her rights to 
support payments to the state of Oeegon. (R. 8:8-18). This 
is consistent with URESA peactice. See O.R.S. §110.081 and 
Utah Code Ann. 77-6la-8. 
The defendant-appellant Robert Crompton has con-
tinuously maintained that Mes. Crompton cannot sue tore-
cover the obligation assigned to the State of Oregon. 
his Answee, he stated: 
Defendant affiematjvely alleges th~t if, 
in filet, there is anv sum of money unpairl 
-2-
In 
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by the defendant to the plaintiff, that 
the plaintiff has duly and regularly assigned 
all of her right, title, and interest in 
and to that payment to the State of Oregon 
and that the plaintiff has no further right, 
title, or interest in and to her alleged 
claim. (R. 31). 
In examination of Mrs. Crompton at trial, defendant 
pursued this theory, and elicited an admission of the 
assignment. 
Q. [Mr. Lewis] And when did you go off 
receiving assistance? 
A. [Mrs. Crompton] I think in January-
February, because I started a work program 
in which I was going to college, which now 
I am still working under a program. 
Q. January or February of this year? 
A. Yes, because I have been in this 
school for nine months, almost. 
Q. Is it safe to say then that up till 
that time all the rights you had have been 
assigned to the State of Oregon while you 
are receiving assistance? 
A. That the support payments were, yes. 
(R. 8:8-18) 
Though the court found against the defendant-appellant on 
the effect of the assignments, defendant again raised the 
issue in objecting to the proposed findings of fact: 
Defendant objects to the Court's Finding 
No. 5 upon the grounds and for the reasons 
that the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claintiff was that she had assigned all ~[ her interest in and to the support pay-
~ents, thereby leaving her not a proper 
party to the herein action and having no 
interest therein. (R. 45). 
-j-
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and also in objecting to the conclusion of law: 
Defendant objects to the Conclusion of 
Law of the Court since the Conclusions are 
not based upon the facts as presented to 
the Court, that the plaintiff, by her own 
testimony, stated that all of her right, 
title and interest has been assigned to 
the State of Oregon and that she is not 
a proper plaintiff, and that the complaint 
should be dismissed. (R. 46). 
Nevertheless, the court found: 
That the plaintiff is entitled to judg-
ment against the defendant in the amount 
of $11,220.65. (R. 28, Conclusion •2). 
The court handled the assignment issue in the following 
manner: 
. the State of Oregon may be entitled 
to all or a part of this judgment and if 
so, the State of Oregon would be entitled 
to an appropriate assignment from this 
plaintiff in that amount. 
Appellant maintains that the lower court acted against 
the weight of the evidence in failing to find an assignment 
and manifestly misapplied the law in failing to bar Mr~. 
Crompton from asserting claims in which she had no interest. 
POINT I 
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ENCOMPASSES BOTH FACTUAL 
AND LEGAL ISSUES. 
In equitable actions appellate review traditionally 
encompasses both the law and the facts. This broad scope of 
review is warranted because the original trial involved no 
finder of fact other than a judge, so the appellate court 
may easily place itself in the position of the trier ot 
-4 
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fact, which is not possible in review of jury trials. Some 
jurisdictions have even adopted a trial de novo review of 
equity cases in their supreme courts. See e.g., Smith v. 
Vehrs, 242 P. 2d 586 (Ore. 1952). 
Utah, while not providing for a trial de novo procedure 
in equitable proceedings, does provide for appellate review 
of the record on both legal and factual issues. This scope 
of review of equity cases is founded in the Utah Constitution. 
The appeal shall be upon the record made 
in the court below ... In equity cases 
the appeal may be on questions of both 
law and fact. . • (Utah Canst. art. 8, 
§9). 
Essentially the same language is found in Rule 72(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact. 
Thus, where the decision below was bottomed in equity and 
where the appellant questions the findings of fact, it is 
the duty of the appellate court to review the accuracy of 
both the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Under Article VIII, Section IX, Constitution 
of Utah, it is both the duty and prerogative 
of this court in an equitable action to re-
view the law and the facts and make its own 
findings and substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court. Mitchell v. 
~litchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974)). 
See also Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 
1416 (1928). 
-5-
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That this Court has such broad review power is evidenced 
by the customary appellate disposition of equity cases where 
the evidence is not found lacking. Generally, this Court 
has not remanded equity cases after appellate review, but 
rather has entered or directed judgment. 
In view, therefore, that this is purely an 
equitable proceeding which comes to this 
court upon questions of both law and fact, 
we have the power, and it is our duty, to 
either make findings and render judgment 
in accordance with the facts and the law 
applicable thereto, or direct that such 
findings and judgment be made and entered 
by the court below. (Johnson v. Seagull 
Inv. Co., 65 Utah 424, 237 P. 945 (1925). 
See also St. George and Washington Canal Co. v. Hurricane 
Canal Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937). As was stated 
in a recent Oklahoma case, Matter of Reyna, 546 P.2d 622, 
(Okla. 1976): 
In a case of equitable cognizance, the 
Supreme Court may weigh the evidence 
and enter such judgment as the trial 
court should have rendered. ( 546 P. 2d 
at 625). 
Entry of judgment by the appellate court is made 
following the review of equity cases because the appellate 
court has full power to find the facts, make conclusions of 
law, and enter judgment. Of course, where the court feels 
there is more necessary evidence available, not in the 
record, it nay remand for further taking of evidence, either 
retaining the case for proceedings after the further evidenc, 
is gathered or remanding it entirely for both findings an~ 
conclusions in the lower court. 
-G-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant contends that the finding relating to the 
assignment does not reflect the testimony at trial. For 
this reason, review of the factual finding as well as the 
legal conclusion, as to the effect of the assignment is 
sought by the appellant. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES AN ASSIGNMENT. 
The trial court refused to make an unequivocal finding 
as to the assignment in favor of the State of Oregon, saying 
only that if such an assignment existed, the State of Oregon 
would be entitled to an assignment in its favor. 
The unequivocal, uncontradicted evidence was that such 
an assignment existed. In fact, the respondent herself gave 
this testimony. (T. 8:8-18). In the absence of any evidence 
to contradict the testimony of assignment, it was clearly 
improper to enter the equivocal finding. As stated in 
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970) this 
court will reverse factual findings of the trial court when 
those findings are clearly preponderated against the evidence 
in the record. Surely, where the trial court has declined 
to find an assignment in the face of a clear admission of an 
2ssignm~nt, this court should reverse the lower court's 
finding. 
-7 
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POINT III 
THE COURT MANIFESTLY MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS C 
THIS CASE. 
In light of the clear testimony of an assignment, it 
was manifestly improper for the trial court to allow judg-
ment for the plaintiff-respondent in the amount of all the 
arrearages, including claims assigned to the State of Orego: 
A. An Assignor is not entitled to sue on 
ass1gned claims. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that actions 
be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest". 
U.R.C.f>. l7{a). This requirement has a long history in Uta'. 
law. In IVilson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah 377, 35 P. 488 (1894) this 
court noted that Utah statutes required "that every action 
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 
35 P.2d at 491, citing 2 Comp. Laws of Utah 1888 §3169. 
That case held that an assignor had no right to prosecute a,. 
action on an assigned claim. 
That the assignee of a claim is the proper party to 
bring suit is affirmed in Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 
427, 367 P. 2d 464 ( 1962). The reason for this rule is that 
an assignor has no further interest in the claim, and havinc! 
received a valuable consideration for making the assignment, 
would be unjustly enriched if permitted to recover on a 
claim after having assigned it. The policy of the rule is 
especially applicable in this present case, where Mrs. 
Cronpton has receive~] suppc)l·t payroent·> froil Lilc State of 
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O~egon in return fo~ he~ assignment, and now seeks to recover 
a~rearages for which the State of Oregon has made compen-
sat ion. The State of Oregon has the right to those claims. 
For an example of a case in which couLts have barred 
assignors from suit, see Acme Blackshop Paving Co. v. 
Brown & Matthews, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 1042, 294 N.Y.S.2d 826 
(1968). 
Clearly, an assignor is not entitled to maintain an 
action on a claim in which the assignor has no interest. 
B. Respondent assigned her rights to support 
prior to January, 1976, to the State of 
Oregon. 
Respondent, by her own testimony, asslgned her rights 
to support payments prior to January, 1976, to the State of 
Oregon, in return for state assistance payments. (R. 8:8-
18) The right assigned was founded on the divorce decree 
filed July 9, 1969, and as modified February l, 1974. Under 
the decree, periodic payments were to be made to the respon-
dent M~s. Crompton. In such a continuing obligation the 
right is not to be a lump sum but to the recurrent installments. 
The obligation can best be vic·wed as several obligations, 
with due dates falling monthly, one afte~ another. While 
M~s. Crompton is entitled to payments not assigned, she is 
not entitled to pay~cnts assigned, during her receipt of 
By her own arlmission she assigned all 
pay~ents p~ior to JJnuary, 1976. 
In a si1~ila~ case, whe~c there was an assignment of 
cl~iMs by t.hc 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assignoc, this Couct has adheced to the rule that the 
assignee i3 the propec party to sue on the assigned claims. 
Chesney v. District Couct of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 513, 
108 P.2d 514 (1941). That rule should apply in this case. 
C. Respondent is not entitled to amounts 
accrued pr1or to January, 1976. 
Clearly in light of the admission of assignment, and 1r. 
light of the law stating that an assignor has no right to 
bring an action on an assigned claim, it is manifestly 
apparent that the lower court misapplied the law to these 
facts. Where such is the case, this Court may cocrect the 
judgment below. See Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 ( 1972) for a statement of this 
rule. 
Appellant urges a correction of the findings to reflect 
the admitted assignments in favor of the State of Ocegon; 
and a correction of the judgment to include the net amount 
accrued since January, 1976. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence at trial could not have been more cogent 
in establishing an assignment of support payments in favor 
of the State of Oregon. Appellant raised his objection to 
respondent's assertion of assi•JrH'cl claims at all arpropriatc 
times. The e q u i t i c s c e r t a in l y cl n not fa 'Jot- an a"' a nl t u 
-10-
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Reversal or amendment of the judgment to include only 
the amounts accrued since January 1976, less payments made, 
is respectfully req~ed. 
DATED this & 1 day 
of Oc~tober,/7 
~ -~ / S. L ;::, or: 
HOW D, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1977, 
I personally mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to ~lr. D. John Musselman, Attorney for Respondent, 
1325 South BOO East, Suite 310, Orem, Utah 84057. 
- l l 
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